Emergency-veto multisig present
A governance & admin factor in the v1.7.0 rubric. Measured per protocol on a s cadence.
Methodology how we score #
**What this measures** This factor checks whether a governance veto or emergency-pause multisig exists that is specifically empowered to stop malicious proposals before they execute — distinct from the standard pause mechanism. The veto multisig must have the power to cancel or delay a queued proposal in the timelock, not merely pause the protocol's operational functions.
**Why it matters** A veto mechanism adds a second defensive layer above the standard timelock: even if a malicious governance proposal accumulates enough votes to pass (flash loan attack, whale concentration, insider vote), a veto multisig composed of independent security-focused parties can cancel it before execution. Several post-2022 governance improvements in major protocols (Compound, Aave, Uniswap) have added security councils or guardian roles specifically for this purpose. The absence of a veto mechanism means the only defense against a passed malicious proposal is the timelock delay itself — which is only useful if someone monitoring the queue takes action.
**Green / Yellow / Red** Green is assigned when an emergency veto multisig exists with at least a 2-of-N threshold, independent from the primary governance multisig, and with documented authority to cancel queued proposals. Yellow covers cases where a veto mechanism exists but is held by the same multisig as the governance executor (not truly independent). Red is assigned when no veto mechanism exists — the timelock alone is the only buffer between a passed proposal and execution.
**Common gray cases** This factor is grayed when the governance system is immutable or operates via a single-step on-chain vote with no separate queueing mechanism, rendering a veto multisig architecturally irrelevant.
**Notable historical examples** No cross-hacked incidents currently linked in database for this factor.
Measurement what to look for #
Determine whether an emergency-veto or guardian multisig exists with power to cancel malicious proposals before execution.