defirisk.co
rubric v1.7.0

Admin = deployer EOA after 7 days

A governance & admin factor in the v1.7.0 rubric. Measured per protocol on a s cadence.

Critical factor. A Red on this factor alone is sufficient to gate a protocol to grade D or F regardless of other category rollups.

Methodology how we score #

**What this measures** This factor checks whether, at the time of assessment (or at deploy+7 days for newly launched protocols), the admin address is still equal to the original deployer EOA with no evidence of transfer to a multisig or governance contract. On-chain reads of the owner(), admin(), or equivalent role slot are compared against the deployer address recorded at contract creation. A seven-day window is used because legitimate teams typically migrate admin authority to a governance structure within the first week of launch; persistence beyond that window is a strong signal of retained unilateral control.

**Why it matters** When a protocol's admin is the same wallet that deployed it, one entity holds both the privileged knowledge of how the protocol was constructed and the unilateral ability to modify or drain it. This combination is strongly correlated with rug pulls in the evidence base. Infini ($49.5M, 2025) demonstrated that a developer who retained admin credentials for 114 days after the handover period could execute a full drain with no external coordination. Merlin DEX ($1.82M, 2023) and Hope Finance ($1.86M, 2023) show the same pattern at smaller scale. The dashboard's synthesis data identifies "retained developer admin role" as one of the clearest predictors of insider-originated loss, particularly when combined with an anonymous team and no public access-control audit.

**Green / Yellow / Red** Green is assigned when admin authority has been verifiably transferred to a multisig or governance contract within seven days of deploy, with on-chain proof of the transfer transaction. Yellow covers cases where the transfer is pending or partially executed (e.g., one of two required steps completed), or where the deployer retains a non-critical role such as a fee-parameter setter. Red is assigned when the admin address is still the deployer EOA at day seven or later, with no on-chain evidence of a transfer in progress.

**Common gray cases** This factor is grayed when the deployer address cannot be identified from on-chain data (e.g., factory-deployed contracts where the factory's own admin holds the role), or when the protocol's governance architecture legitimately uses a deployer-controlled multisig that is separately assessed under RD-F-027 and RD-F-028.

**Notable historical examples** - **Infini** ($49.5M, 2025): Developer retained admin credentials 114 days post-deployment; executed drain without any external coordination. - **Hope Finance** ($1.86M, 2023): All three multisig owners coordinated a drain; admin had never been separated from the founding team. - **Merlin DEX** ($1.82M, 2023): Privileged Feeto EOA at deployment gave the developer direct drain capability confirmed by auditor but not remediated. - **BrincFi** ($1.1M, 2021): Head of development retained full upgrade authority post-launch; lawsuit filed after drain. - **Kannagi Finance** ($1.1M, 2023): Anonymous team retained MainChef privileged withdrawal function on zkSync.

**★ Critical factor** This factor alone is sufficient to trigger a D or F grade under rubric v1.7.0 — a single red assessment here overrides all other category scores. When the deployer EOA remains admin beyond the seven-day migration window, the protocol's security model is entirely dependent on the continued trustworthiness and operational security of a single individual.

Measurement what to look for #

Determine whether, at t = deploy+7d, the admin address still equals the deployer EOA with no evidence of transfer to a multisig.

Data & output #

Data source
`owner()` read at current block + compare to deployer address from contract creation tx on Etherscan
Output format
Green / Yellow / Red · critical gate active
Evidence artifact
Deployer address (from creation tx) + current owner address + deploy block timestamp
Confidence signal
green = admin transferred to multisig within 7 days of deploy; red = admin address still equals deployer EOA at check time; gray = admin role not determinable

Scored protocols 80 carry this factor #

Protocol RD-F-043
Aave v3 ethereum green Across Protocol ethereum gray Aerodrome Finance base green Axelar Network ethereum green Babylon Protocol bitcoin green Balancer (v2 + v3) ethereum green Beefy Finance ethereum green BENQI avalanche green BlackRock USD Institutional Digital Liquidity Fund (BUIDL) ethereum yellow Cap (cUSD / stcUSD) ethereum green Centrifuge ethereum green Chainlink CCIP ethereum green Circle USYC binance red Compound V3 (Comet) ethereum green Concrete ethereum green Convex Finance ethereum green crvUSD (Curve Stablecoin) ethereum red Curve Finance ethereum green deBridge ethereum green Dolomite ethereum green dYdX v4 (dYdX Chain) dydx not_applicable EigenLayer ethereum green Ethena ethereum green ether.fi ethereum green Euler V2 ethereum green Falcon Finance ethereum yellow Fluid ethereum green Frax Finance ethereum green GMX v2 (GMX Synthetics) arbitrum green Hyperlane ethereum green Hyperliquid arbitrum green Jito solana green Jupiter solana green Jupiter Perpetual Exchange solana green JustLend DAO tron green Kamino Lend solana green Kinetiq hyperliquid green Lido ethereum green Liquid Collective (LsETH) ethereum green Liquity V1 + V2 (LUSD / BOLD) ethereum not_applicable Lista DAO bsc green Lombard Finance ethereum yellow M^0 ethereum yellow Maple Finance ethereum green Marinade Finance solana green Meteora solana green mETH Protocol ethereum green Midas ethereum green Morpho V1 (Morpho Blue + MetaMorpho) ethereum green Multipli ethereum red Ondo Finance ethereum green OpenEden ethereum green Orca solana green PancakeSwap bsc green Pendle Finance ethereum red Polymarket polygon green QuickSwap polygon yellow Raydium solana green Rocket Pool ethereum green Sanctum solana green Save (formerly Solend) solana red Sky Lending (formerly MakerDAO) ethereum green Spark Protocol ethereum green Spiko stellar green Stake DAO ethereum yellow StakeWise v3 ethereum green Stargate Finance ethereum gray stHYPE (Valantis Labs) hyperliquid green SUNSwap (sun.io) tron yellow Superstate ethereum green Sushi (SushiSwap) — v2 + v3 + Trident + BentoBox/Kashi + SushiXSwap ethereum green Symbiotic ethereum green Synapse Protocol ethereum green Uniswap (v2 + v3) ethereum green USDD (Decentralized USD) tron red Usual (USD0 / bUSD0 / USUAL) ethereum green Veda (BoringVault) ethereum yellow Venus Protocol bsc green Wormhole ethereum gray Yearn Finance ethereum green

Linked hacks 5 historical incidents #

causalInfini (Crypto Neobank) — Retained Admin Privileges — Rogue Developer Backdoor2025-02-24 · $50M · Retained Admin Privileges — Rogue Developer Backdoor · ★ Admin = deployer EOA + no multisig transfer within 7 days [via cross-hack: Factor 24: Retained Developer Admin Role Post-Deployment]
causalKannagi Finance — Insider rug — privileged admin withdrawal on behalf of users (MainChef address)2023-07-29 · $1M · Insider rug — privileged admin withdrawal on behalf of users (MainChef address) · ★ Admin = deployer EOA + no multisig transfer within 7 days [via cross-hack: Factor 24: Retained Developer Admin Role Post-Deployment]
causalMerlin DEX — Insider rug — max approval drain via privileged Feeto address2023-04-25 · $2M · Insider rug — max approval drain via privileged Feeto address · ★ Admin = deployer EOA + no multisig transfer within 7 days [via cross-hack: Factor 24: Retained Developer Admin Role Post-Deployment]
causalHope Finance — Insider Exit Scam — Malicious Fake Router Pre-Deployed2023-02-20 · $2M · Insider Exit Scam — Malicious Fake Router Pre-Deployed · ★ Admin = deployer EOA + no multisig transfer within 7 days [via cross-hack: Factor 24: Retained Developer Admin Role Post-Deployment]
causalBrincFi — Insider backdoor — rescueTokens() admin drain via ownership transfer + malicious contract upgrade2021-12-14 · $1M · Insider backdoor — rescueTokens() admin drain via ownership transfer + malicious contract upgrade · ★ Admin = deployer EOA + no multisig transfer within 7 days [via cross-hack: Factor 24: Retained Developer Admin Role Post-Deployment]
rubric_version v1.7.0 factor RD-F-043 category 2 carried 80 critical yes