Timelock on sensitive actions
Aerodrome Finance's assessment for RD-F-033 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No sensitive action has a timelock: setGovernor(), setEpochGovernor(), setMinter(), setTeamRate(), setPauser(), setFee(), killGauge(), FactoryRegistry.approve()/unapprove(), VotingEscrow team functions. All execute immediately upon multisig approval. Data cache confirms timelock_address: null.
Sources #
- GitHubVoter.sol — no timelock on governor settersVoter.sol — setGovernor/setEpochGovernor callable immediately by governorretrieved 2026-05-04
- Minter.sol — no timelock on team functionsMinter.sol — no timelock on setTeamRate, setTeamretrieved 2026-05-04
- SPECIFICATION.md — no timelockSPECIFICATION.md — governance operates within epoch windows only; no TimelockControllerretrieved 2026-05-04
Methodology #
For each sensitive action category (mint / pause / rescue / setOracle / upgrade), determine whether execution requires going through the declared timelock.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →
rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol aerodrome factor RD-F-033 score red collected_at 2026-05-04 19:56:03