★ Single admin EOA
Axelar Network's assessment for RD-F-027 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
[★ CRITICAL] 0x6f24A47Fc8AE5441Eb47EFfC3665e70e69Ac3F05 confirmed bare EOA (Etherscan: no contract code, no bytecode, compiler=-NA-). This EOA is the sole proxy admin/owner of the InterchainTokenService (ITS) proxy (0xB5FB4BE02232B1bBA4dC8f81dc24C26980dE9e3C). It directly called upgrade() on ITS without any multisig relay or timelock in Jul 2025 (tx 0x59a8471b..., block 22,884,224) and Feb 2025 (tx 0x630d798e..., block 21,897,945). The Upgradable.sol base contract upgrade() function is onlyOwner with no delay. This EOA also holds setPauseStatus(), setTrustedChain(), removeTrustedChain(), and migrateInterchainToken() on ITS. The AxelarGateway's strong governance (validator quorum + 7-day timelock) does NOT extend to ITS — these are separate trust domains. A single private key compromise allows immediate, no-timelock ITS implementation replacement. Prior assessment scored green based on the gateway surface; U18 resolution confirms red on the ITS surface.
Sources #
- EtherscanITS upgrade tx Jul 2025 — FROM=bare EOAITS proxy readProxyContract: owner=0x6f24A47Fc8AE5441Eb47EFfC3665e70e69Ac3F05. Upgrade tx Jul 9 2025 block 22884224: FROM=0x6f24..., function=upgrade(), no intermediary contract.retrieved 2026-05-17
- ITS proxy admin — Etherscan EOA confirmation0x6f24A47Fc8AE5441Eb47EFfC3665e70e69Ac3F05 — no contract code, bare EOA confirmed. Holds 1.577 ETH plus multichain tokens. No multisig interactions in recent tx history.retrieved 2026-05-17
- Upgradable.sol — axelar-gmp-sdk-solidity (onlyOwner on upgrade)Upgradable.sol: upgrade() is onlyOwner modifier, no timelock, no multisig requirement. No _disableInitializers() call.retrieved 2026-05-17
- ITS upgrade tx Feb 2025 — FROM=bare EOAITS upgrade tx Feb 21 2025 block 21897945: FROM=0x6f24..., function=upgrade(address newImplementation, bytes32 newImplementationCodeHash, bytes setupParams), direct call.retrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Determine whether the effective upgrade/owner/rescue role is held by a single EOA (not a multisig) with no timelock on sensitive operations.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →