★ Admin has mint() with unlimited max
Axelar Network's assessment for RD-F-042 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Gateway mints bridged wrapped tokens via validator-set authorized commands (≥2/3 quorum). setTokenMintLimits() callable by mintLimiter (Multisig 3-of-6, no additional timelock) to set per-token per-6h transfer caps. The mint authority is the validator quorum (strong), but the Multisig can reset mintLimits to any value without timelock. No traditional admin-only mint(uint256) function found on ITS or gateway. mintLimits act as a secondary circuit breaker that the Multisig can adjust.
Sources #
- GitHubAxelarGateway.sol — GitHubAxelarGateway.sol: setTokenMintLimits() callable by mintLimiter role; upgrade() gated by governanceretrieved 2026-05-17
- Axelar Security Model — DocsAxelar security docs: rate limiting on gateways — mintLimiter controls per-asset per-window capsretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Determine whether an admin-callable `mint` on a protocol token has no supply cap or an unlimited maximum supply.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →