Oracle price deviation >X% from secondary
Axelar Network's assessment for RD-F-099 — scored not_applicable on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Axelar's bridge verification relies on validator-set quorum consensus (Cosmos-SDK proof-of-stake), not on on-chain price oracles. Oracle price deviation does not affect gateway message verification or bridge security. The 19 Chainlink feed addresses in the data cache are assessed as peripheral (GasService fee estimation or integrator-side use) rather than core security inputs. Confirmation of peripheral status is flagged for oracle-dependency-analyst; if any feed is confirmed as a core security input this factor should be re-evaluated.
Sources #
- DocsAxelar Security Overview — validator consensus modelAxelar security model — validator-quorum consensus, not oracle-based bridge verificationretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Detect whether the primary oracle's reported price deviates >X% from the best available secondary source (another feed or venue).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →