Cross-chain bridge unverified mint pattern
Axelar Network's assessment for RD-F-106 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No active mint-without-proof pattern detected on Axelar gateways. The GNUS.AI 2024 exploit involved an attacker who compromised the application-layer private key and used Axelar bridge as a passive conduit to move counterfeit tokens cross-chain — this was an exploit at the application layer (GNUS.AI token contract), not a compromise of Axelar's proof/consensus verification. No unverified-mint event against Axelar's own gateway security has been documented.
Sources #
- URLGNUS.AI Discord Hack — $1.27M StolenGNUS.AI exploit — application-layer key compromise; Axelar used as passive venue, gateway security not compromisedretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Detect cross-chain activity consistent with an unverified mint on the destination chain (deposit on source without corresponding verified proof on dest).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →