★ Flash-loanable voting weight
Balancer (v2 + v3)'s assessment for RD-F-036 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
veBAL (0xC128a9954e6c874eA3d62ce62B468bA073093F25) uses vote-escrow with checkpoint-based historical balance via balanceOfAt(address, block). Voting power is time-locked, decays linearly. Smart contract depositors are explicitly disallowed. Governance is Snapshot off-chain — no on-chain governor contract that could be flash-loan attacked. Flash-loan voting attack is architecturally impossible.
Sources #
- EtherscanBalancer: veBAL VotingEscrowveBAL VotingEscrow 0xC128a9954e6c874eA3d62ce62B468bA073093F25 — checkpoint mechanism confirmedretrieved 2026-05-05
Methodology #
Determine whether governance voting power is a function of current token balance of a transferable token with no lock or checkpoint, making it flash-loan susceptible.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →