Large governance proposal queued
Cap (cUSD / stcUSD)'s assessment for RD-F-101 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
T-09 v1 launch signal — applicable in spirit but structurally limited for Cap's governance architecture. Cap has no on-chain Governor contract (data cache: governance.governor_address = null, governance.snapshot_space = null). All protocol changes flow through: 3-of-5 dev multisig (0xb8FC49402dF3ee4f8587268FB89fda4d621a8793) → TimelockController (0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab, 86400s delay). No ProposalCreated events are emitted. The signal's fire rule (ProposalCreated matching admin-change selectors) cannot execute on this architecture. Pipeline adaptation required: monitor TimelockController CallScheduled events instead. No suspicious queued transaction detected from OSINT as of 2026-05-17. Yellow: applicable surface exists (TimelockController is the governance equivalent) but signal cannot be wired up without protocol-specific adaptation.
Sources #
- EtherscanEtherscan: Cap TimelockController0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab — OZ TimelockController, 86400s delayretrieved 2026-05-17
- Cap data cache — governance topology (no Governor).research/protocols/cap/00-data-cache.json sources.governance (governor_address: null, snapshot_space: null, timelock_address: 0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab, timelock_delay_seconds: 86400)retrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Detect whether a governance proposal with potentially protocol-impactful payload has been queued for execution (including Security-Council threshold-reduction variant).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →