Historical bad-debt events
Compound V3 (Comet)'s assessment for RD-F-067 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
April 2026 KelpDAO rsETH exploit: attackers deposited stolen rsETH on cWETHv3, borrowed ~$39.4M WETH. RSETh became worthless. Target reserves cWETHv3 ≈ 5,000 WETH (~$13M). Estimated reserve shortfall ~$26M — governance resolution pending as of assessment date. No prior V3 bad-debt events. Rekt DB shows 0 incidents.
Detail #
Rekt database (data cache rekt.incidents: []) shows no historical V3 exploits. April 2026 rsETH/KelpDAO incident: attackers used rsETH (stolen from Kelp bridge) as collateral on cWETHv3, borrowed ~$39.4M WETH. Pause Guardian invoked pause on WETH, USDC, wstETH Ethereum markets and WETH on L2s. RSETh collateral value dropped to near zero. cWETHv3 target reserves = 5,000 WETH (~$13M at ~$2,600/ETH). If all $39.4M is bad debt, reserve gap ≈ $26M — requires governance remedy. One yellow event (not green). Bad debt not socialized (no depositor losses confirmed); resolution pending governance.
Sources #
- Curator noteProfile §10 incident referenceProfile §10: April 2026 KelpDAO rsETH indirect exposure — Compound V3 received stolen rsETH depositsretrieved 2026-04-27
- https://rekt.newsretrieved 2026-04-27
- RareSkills liquidation: reserves as bad debt bufferRareSkills: protocol reserves absorb bad debt; buyCollateral() mechanism; target reserves cUSDCv3 = 5M USDC, cWETHv3 = 5,000 WETHretrieved 2026-04-27
Methodology #
Count and sum (USD) the number of documented bad-debt events where the protocol socialized losses across depositors.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →