Bridge validator threshold (k-of-M)
Compound V3 (Comet)'s assessment for RD-F-149 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Threshold is determined by canonical L2 bridge models, not by Compound. Polygon PoS: 2/3+ validators. Arbitrum/Optimism: fraud-proof model (not k-of-M signature). Compound's effective threshold: trust canonical bridge delivery.
Detail #
BaseBridgeReceiver validates rootMessageSender == govTimelock after canonical bridge authentication. No Compound-controlled k-of-M threshold. Different canonical bridges have different security models.
Sources #
- AuditOpenZeppelin Bridge Receiver Audit — governance relay architectureOpenZeppelin Compound Polygon Bridge Receiver Auditretrieved 2026-04-27
Methodology #
Read the signature threshold required to approve a cross-chain message (for non-LZ bridges).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →