Fallback behavior on oracle failure

Convex Finance's assessment for RD-F-051 — scored not_applicable on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

Convex has no oracle to fail; F051 (fallback behavior on oracle failure) is not applicable. The BoosterOwner's forceShutdown path (with 30-day FORCE_DELAY) is the only operational fallback mechanism, and it is triggered by gauge compatibility issues, not oracle failures.

Sources #

GitHub
Convex Finance Platform Contracts — BoosterOwner.solconvex-eth/platform — BoosterOwner.sol: FORCE_DELAY = 30 days; forceShutdownSystem is the emergency path; no oracle-failure fallback path exists because there is no oracleretrieved 2026-05-16

Methodology #

Identify the declared fallback behavior (pause, secondary source, last-known-price, revert) when the primary oracle reverts or reports a stale value.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol convex-finance factor RD-F-051 score not_applicable collected_at 2026-05-16 02:41:28