Real-capital social-engineering persona
Curve Finance's assessment for RD-F-184 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No evidence of a team contributor or external integrator persona with >=USD 1M of real-capital deposits used to build credibility ahead of social-engineering attack on Curve. Both major Curve incidents (July 2023 Vyper compiler exploit; August 2022 DNS hijack) were technical/infrastructure attacks — not insider social engineering. The Drift Protocol reference case for F184 (DPRK UNC4736 real-capital persona, 6-month build-up) has no analogous evidence at Curve. Egorov's personal $85-100M CRV-backed loans were personal finance, not a social-engineering setup.
Sources #
- URLAugust 10 2022: Curve Frontend Hacked | Curve SubstackCurve August 2022 DNS hijackretrieved 2026-04-28
- $285M Drift Hack Traced to Six-Month DPRK Social Engineering | The Hacker NewsDrift DPRK social engineering — F184 reference clusterretrieved 2026-04-28
- Curve Pool Reentrancy Exploit Postmortem | LlamaRiskCurve July 2023 postmortem — technical exploitretrieved 2026-04-28
Methodology #
Determine whether a curator-flagged "team contributor" or "external integrator" persona has ≥$1M of attributed real-capital deposits to the target protocol or peer protocols, potentially used to build credibility ahead of a social-engineering attack.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →