Cross-chain bridge unverified mint pattern
deBridge's assessment for RD-F-106 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
**Phase:** v1 deferred (P1; high-lift engineering) **Applicable:** Yes — this is directly applicable. DMP uses a validator-signature-based mint model: assets are locked on source chain, and wrapped tokens are minted on destination chain after validators provide threshold signatures. An unverified-mint attack (insufficient validator signatures accepted) is the primary architectural attack vector for this protocol. **Current posture:** The SignatureVerifier contract enforces 8-of-12 signature t...
Sources #
- URLhttps://docs.debridge.com/dmp-details/dmp/protocol-overviewretrieved 2026-04-28
Methodology #
Detect cross-chain activity consistent with an unverified mint on the destination chain (deposit on source without corresponding verified proof on dest).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →