Oracle-manipulation-proof borrow cap
Dolomite's assessment for RD-F-073 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Dolomite has per-asset supply caps via getMarketMaxWei. For major assets with deep Chainlink feeds (ETH/BTC/USDC/USDT), borrow caps appear calibrated to liquid oracle depth. However, the WLFI case demonstrates inadequate calibration for long-tail assets: the 5.1B token supply cap for WLFI was set at a level that allowed the protocol to accumulate collateral exceeding 4x the total WLFI available on Binance. This means oracle manipulation resistance (the asset's position in a thin market relative to the oracle feed depth) was not adequately factored into cap-setting for this asset class. Pattern may extend to other long-tail isolation assets. Exact borrow caps for all assets require getMarketMaxWei on-chain reads (not performed here; oracle-dep-analyst scope for feed-depth calibration).
Sources #
- DocsDolomite Risk Management - Supply CapsSupply caps limit protocol exposure; queryable via getMarketMaxWei on Arbiscan; WLFI supply cap was 5.1B tokens per Cryptonomist reportingretrieved 2026-05-16
- Chaos Labs WLFI Borrow Cap Adequacy AnalysisChaos Labs: WLFI supply cap allowed accumulation exceeding 4x Binance available depth, indicating cap not calibrated to oracle/market manipulation resistanceretrieved 2026-05-16
- Dolomite Data Cache - Oracle Feedsdata-cache oracle_feeds: 19 Chainlink feeds on Arbitrum for blue-chip assets with low deviation thresholds (ETH 0.05%, BTC 0.05%, USDC 0.1%); Ethereum and Berachain feeds not in cacheretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether the per-asset borrow cap is ≤ (oracle pool depth × manipulation-resistance multiplier).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →