Circuit breaker on price deviation
Euler V2's assessment for RD-F-057 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No in-adapter circuit breaker exists in any euler-price-oracle adapter. No maxDeviationBps, price-guard, or cross-oracle deviation check is present in ChainlinkOracle, PythOracle, UniswapV3Oracle, or EulerRouter. The EVK vault logic does not implement a protocol-level price-deviation circuit breaker. If a Chainlink feed returns its minAnswer/maxAnswer-clamped value during a crash, the protocol cannot detect or reject the anomalous price. This is a design limitation — no deviation-based circuit breaker at any layer.
Sources #
- GitHubEulerRouter — Absence of Deviation CheckEulerRouter.sol — no price deviation checkretrieved 2026-05-04
- ChainlinkOracle — Absence of Circuit BreakerChainlinkOracle.sol _getQuote() — no deviation check; EulerRouter.sol — no deviation checkretrieved 2026-05-04
Methodology #
Determine whether the protocol halts or reverts if the oracle-reported price deviates by more than X% from a reference within Y blocks.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →