defirisk.co
rubric v1.7.0

LP token balanceOf used for pricing

Euler V2's assessment for RD-F-061 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

No standard euler-price-oracle adapter uses balanceOf for pricing. LidoOracle reads wstETH.stEthPerToken() (rate function). PendleOracle uses Pendle on-chain TWAP interface. RateProviderOracle calls getRate(). EulerSwap integration uses vault share accounting — not LP token balanceOf. No donation-manipulation pricing vector identified in the oracle adapter library.

Sources #

Methodology #

Determine whether protocol pricing is derived from the `balanceOf` of LP tokens in a contract (manipulable by direct token transfer / donation).

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol euler-v2 factor RD-F-061 score green collected_at 2026-05-04 19:56:06