Oracle-manipulation-proof borrow cap
Euler V2's assessment for RD-F-073 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Borrow caps exist as governor-configurable per-asset parameters, enforced at batch completion (whitepaper). For Chainlink-fed vaults (ETH/USD, BTC/USD, USDC/USD — see oracle feed list in data cache), manipulation resistance is high and caps are likely well-sized. However, EVK supports UniswapV3Oracle TWAP adapters (profile §7); for vaults using these, cap adequacy relative to TWAP pool depth is unverified. Per-vault cap-vs-pool-depth analysis not performed at OSINT tier. Yellow: caps confirmed present; adequacy against TWAP oracle manipulation unverified for all vaults.
Sources #
- Docshttps://github.com/euler-xyz/euler-vault-kit/blob/master/docs/whitepaper.mdretrieved 2026-05-04
- 00-profile.md §7 Key External Dependenciesretrieved 2026-05-04
Methodology #
Determine whether the per-asset borrow cap is ≤ (oracle pool depth × manipulation-resistance multiplier).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →