First-depositor / share-inflation guard
Euler V2's assessment for RD-F-075 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
First-depositor / share-inflation guard confirmed present via multiple independent sources. Virtual deposit mechanism ensures exchange rate is well-defined even with zero shares, preventing rounding-based attacks. Vault.sol includes zero-share revert guard (E_ZeroShares). Rounding direction control (toSharesDown/Up) further constrains attack surface. Cantina 2025 security engagement confirmed no high/medium issues in these surfaces. The EVK was purpose-built to address this attack class as documented in Euler's own security blog.
Sources #
- Docshttps://github.com/euler-xyz/euler-vault-kit/blob/master/docs/whitepaper.mdretrieved 2026-05-04
- https://cantina.xyz/blog/cantina-euler-2025-modular-lending-securityretrieved 2026-05-04
Methodology #
Determine whether the vault has a first-depositor guard (seed deposit on deploy, virtual-share offset, or floor-check).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →