Large governance proposal queued
Euler V2's assessment for RD-F-101 — scored not_assessed on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
[downgraded: only curator_note evidence] No flagged-pattern proposal identified. EUL uses OZ Governor ERC20Votes with checkpointed balances (getPastVotes at prior block) -- not flash-loan susceptible at the checkpoint layer. Quorum 815,480 EUL; circulating ~19.8M EUL (4.1%). No major EUL flash-loan pool on Aave V3 identified.
Sources #
- Curator notedocs.euler.finance/EUL/overview/: ERC20Votes OZ 4.6.0retrieved 2026-05-04
- euler.foundation/euler-DAO/governance: 75,000 EUL threshold, 815,480 EUL quorum, 2-day voting, >=48h timelockretrieved 2026-05-04
Methodology #
Detect whether a governance proposal with potentially protocol-impactful payload has been queued for execution (including Security-Council threshold-reduction variant).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →
rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol euler-v2 factor RD-F-101 score not_assessed collected_at 2026-05-04 19:56:06