Timelock on sensitive actions
Falcon Finance's assessment for RD-F-033 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No sensitive action (upgrade, mint-role-grant, rescue, pause, parameter-set) is timelocked. All route through the 4-of-6 Safe as direct calls with 0-second delay.
Detail #
No timelock contract exists. USDf proxy upgrade: direct Safe call. USDf DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE grant: direct Safe call. StakingRewardsDistributor rescueTokens: direct admin call. All functions assessable from ABIs confirm no queue-and-execute pattern. Contrast with Lombard (1-hour TimelockController for upgrades, rated red on F032 even with 1h delay). Falcon has no delay at all.
Sources #
- EtherscanUSDf implementation ABI — no timelock-gated functionshttps://etherscan.io/address/0x3aDf34C09DAC24E4BAeFB1b1df4C2992edC2b789#coderetrieved 2026-05-12
- StakingRewardsDistributor ABI — rescueTokens() not timelockedhttps://etherscan.io/address/0x8AF2EFa47efB2095b80D82577c597186Ea2FFFea#coderetrieved 2026-05-12
Methodology #
For each sensitive action category (mint / pause / rescue / setOracle / upgrade), determine whether execution requires going through the declared timelock.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →