Circuit breaker on price deviation
Falcon Finance's assessment for RD-F-057 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No on-chain circuit breaker identified in any verified Falcon contract. USDf ERC20 and sUSDf ERC4626 implementations have no price-deviation check logic. Off-chain operational circuit breaker may exist but is unverifiable.
Detail #
Etherscan readContract for USDf impl (0x3aDf34C...) and sUSDf impl (0x0D132bEE...): no maxDeviationBps, priceGuard, or circuit-breaker functions present. Pashov and Zellic audits (Feb-Mar 2025) do not mention circuit-breaker design for collateral pricing. Docs risk-management page describes manual oversight but no on-chain price deviation halt. The absence is high-confidence for the verified contracts; the unidentified minting controller may implement one but cannot be confirmed.
Sources #
- EtherscanUSDf Implementation Contract — EtherscanEtherscan 0x3aDf34C09DAC24E4BAeFB1b1df4C2992edC2b789 readContract — no circuit breaker functionsretrieved 2026-05-12
- Zellic Audit Report — Falcon Finance USDf/sUSDfPashov audit Feb 2025 and Zellic audit Feb-Mar 2025 — neither mentions circuit breaker in scoperetrieved 2026-05-12
Methodology #
Determine whether the protocol halts or reverts if the oracle-reported price deviates by more than X% from a reference within Y blocks.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →