Historical bad-debt events
GMX v2 (GMX Synthetics)'s assessment for RD-F-067 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
GMX v2 (GM pools) has zero confirmed bad-debt events as of 2026-05-05. The July 2025 $42M exploit targeted GMX v1/GLP contracts (specifically a reentrancy in executeDecreaseOrder that manipulated GLP AUM calculations) — the v2/GM pool system was not exploited and sustained no loss. The attacker voluntarily returned approximately $37M, keeping a $5M bounty. The Abracadabra Money March 2025 incident ($13M loss) was caused by a bug in Abracadabra's own gmCauldron contract logic that used GMX v2 GM tokens as collateral; GMX v2 contracts were not exploited and no GM pool solvency loss occurred. GMX's ADL mechanism is specifically designed to prevent bad debt: positions are forcibly reduced when the PnL-to-pool ratio exceeds MAX_PNL_FACTOR_FOR_ADL. Green: no bad-debt events in GMX v2.
Sources #
- URLCoinDesk — Abracadabra $13M exploit March 2025 (third-party integrator, not GMX v2)https://www.coindesk.com/business/2025/03/25/abracadabra-drained-of-usd13m-in-exploit-targeting-cauldrons-tied-to-gmx-liquidity-tokensretrieved 2026-05-05
- GMX v2 docs — Liquidations and ADL mechanismhttps://docs.gmx.io/docs/trading/liquidations/retrieved 2026-05-05
- The Block — GMX v1 $42M hack July 2025 (v1/GLP, not v2)https://www.theblock.co/post/361806/hacker-drains-42-million-from-decentralized-perpetual-exchange-gmxretrieved 2026-05-05
Methodology #
Count and sum (USD) the number of documented bad-debt events where the protocol socialized losses across depositors.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →