Oracle-manipulation-proof borrow cap
GMX v2 (GMX Synthetics)'s assessment for RD-F-073 — scored not_applicable on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
GMX v2 is a perpetuals DEX with no lending borrow caps (data cache sources.defillama.borrow.present = false). The factor addresses oracle-manipulation-proof borrow caps as a defense against DEX-TWAP oracle attacks on lending protocols. This vector does not apply to GMX v2. The analogous manipulation deterrents in GMX v2 are: (a) price impact fees that make large OI skew increasingly expensive as OI grows, (b) MAX_OPEN_INTEREST caps per market side (initially set at $256M for BTC/ETH, $4M for AVAX/LINK, $1M for other markets per Chaos Labs recommendations at v2 launch per LD Capital analysis), and (c) Chainlink Data Streams pull-oracle architecture which requires coordinated attack on multiple DON-signed price feeds. These serve analogous protective functions but are not DEX-TWAP borrow-cap vectors. Factor is not applicable.
Sources #
- URLLD Capital — GMX v2 analysis: synthetic markets flagged as higher ADL riskhttps://ld-capital.medium.com/changes-and-impacts-of-gmx-v2-6ed0e4c10f93retrieved 2026-05-05
- GMX v2 docs — Providing Liquidity (pool composition)https://docs.gmx.io/docs/providing-liquidity/retrieved 2026-05-05
Methodology #
Determine whether the per-asset borrow cap is ≤ (oracle pool depth × manipulation-resistance multiplier).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →