Bridge rate-limiter / chain-pause as positive mitigant
GMX v2 (GMX Synthetics)'s assessment for RD-F-185 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No explicit on-chain rate-limiter (per-window outflow cap) confirmed for the primary GMX v2 trading protocol. LayerZeroProvider.sol validates endpoint/provider (structural control) but no volume cap. Arbitrum sequencer has emergency powers but GMX does not control Arbitrum chain pauses. Operational manual pause demonstrated when GMX v1 trading was disabled post-July 2025 hack — but this is team operational action not a programmatic rate-limiter. Partial mitigant present (operational capability) but no formal on-chain rate-limit mechanism.
Sources #
- DocsGMX no automated sequencer check — manual pause onlydocs.gmx.io/docs/api/contracts/known-issues/ — 'sequencer downtime lacks contract validation; keepers must manually pause'retrieved 2026-05-05
- LayerZeroProvider structural controls (no rate-limiter)LayerZeroProvider.sol — validateMultichainEndpoint and validateMultichainProvider checks; lzCompose validation; no outflow rate-limiterretrieved 2026-05-05
Methodology #
Determine whether the bridge implements a per-window outflow rate-limiter (and at what cap), and whether the protocol team can trigger a chain-level or validator-set emergency pause.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →