Oracle-manipulation-proof borrow cap
Hyperliquid's assessment for RD-F-073 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Factor is borrow-cap specific (lending protocol N/A per taxonomy PD-024). The analogous risk in perps is whether per-asset OI caps are calibrated to oracle-manipulation resistance. For HyperCore-curated perps: position size limits exist but are not publicly documented (closed-source L1 config). For HIP-3 perps: no per-deployer or per-asset OI cap is described in available documentation. JELLY incident: $4.5M capital → $13.5M HLP exposure, implying the 'oracle-manipulation-proof position cap' analog was absent or insufficient for thin-market perps. Scoring gray due to factor type mismatch with borrow-cap definition; the perps-analog risk is captured under F067/F072.
Sources #
- URL2025-26-03 JELLY Post-mortem — $4.5M capital drove $13.5M HLP exposureJELLY incident — position-size vs. liquidity mismatch demonstratedretrieved 2026-04-28
- HIP-3: Builder-deployed perpetuals — Hyperliquid DocsHIP-3 docs — no OI cap documentation foundretrieved 2026-04-28
Methodology #
Determine whether the per-asset borrow cap is ≤ (oracle pool depth × manipulation-resistance multiplier).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →