Fallback behavior on oracle failure
Jupiter's assessment for RD-F-051 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Perps: Documented three-oracle fallback — Edge stale/out-of-threshold → Chainlink vs Pyth comparison; if 2-of-3 fail → no price update (positions freeze). This is a documented secondary-oracle fallback, not last-known-price. Lend: staleness thresholds enforced (600s standard / 7200s liquidations); confidence interval checks on Pyth; if threshold exceeded → operations halted for that market (pause behavior). Aggregator: no oracle fallback needed (uses live pool reserves per tx).
Sources #
- DocsOracles — Jupiter Lend Developer DocsLend: staleness thresholds 600s/7200s; Pyth confidence interval ≤2%/≤4%; halt on breachretrieved 2026-04-29
- Jupiter Perpetuals price oraclesPerps fallback: Edge stale → Chainlink+Pyth comparison; 2-of-3 fail → no updateretrieved 2026-04-29
Methodology #
Identify the declared fallback behavior (pause, secondary source, last-known-price, revert) when the primary oracle reverts or reports a stale value.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →