Avg attacker reconnaissance time for peer-class protocols
JustLend DAO's assessment for RD-F-163 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Attacker wallet reconnaissance time before strike (similar class) — P2 static/contextual factor. For Compound v2-fork protocols, hack DB shows reconnaissance lead times ranging from near-zero (flash-loan governance: same-block) to 78+ days (USPD-style pre-funding). No known reconnaissance activity against JustLend specifically. For JustLend, the relevant reconnaissance axes would be: (a) WJST accumulation for governance attack; (b) oracle manipulation preparation (TRON Chainlink feed probing); (c) cross-chain bridging to fund TRON wallet. These would be observable on Tronscan but require active monitoring. Curated reconnaissance-time DB for TRON peer protocols not established.
Sources #
- InternalJustLend data cache and T-01 methodology — reconnaissance baselineData cache sources.rekt.incidents = [] — no known prior exploits; hack DB peer-class Compound v2 reconnaissance patterns referenced from T-01 methodology (USPD 78-day pattern).retrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Report the average number of days of attacker reconnaissance activity before a strike on peer-class protocols (lending/DEX/bridge/perps), sourced from the hack database.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →