Oracle-manipulation-proof borrow cap
Kamino Lend's assessment for RD-F-073 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Borrow caps exist per asset (E-mode docs confirm PYUSD cap at $0 for non-SOL/wBTC collateral). Advanced Oracle Risk Engine (EWMA, multi-source) adds manipulation resistance. Specific cap vs. pool-depth calculations not publicly enumerated.
Detail #
Borrow caps are confirmed to exist per Kamino docs: E-mode caps restrict PYUSD borrowing to SOL and wBTC collateral only ($0 against other collateral). Per-asset borrow caps exist based on asset risk score. The Oracle Risk Engine uses EWMA pricing across Pyth, Switchboard, and Chainlink Data Streams — multi-source validation reduces oracle manipulation risk. However, the specific per-asset borrow cap figure vs. oracle pool depth calculation (the F073 methodology criterion) is not publicly enumerated. Risk managers (Gauntlet, Allez Labs) are responsible for sizing caps appropriately, but their methodology is not publicly disclosed in detail.
Sources #
- DocsKamino E-Mode Caps DocumentationE-Mode Caps docs — PYUSD borrow cap $0 except SOL/wBTC collateralretrieved 2026-04-27
- Exponential.fi — Kamino Lend ProfileExponential.fi — Advanced Oracle Risk Engine, EWMA, multi-sourceretrieved 2026-04-27
Methodology #
Determine whether the per-asset borrow cap is ≤ (oracle pool depth × manipulation-resistance multiplier).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →