RD-F-009 red Formal verification coverage No formal verification (Certora, Halmos, Kani) found for any Kinetiq contract. Code4rena README states 52% statement test coverage — not formal verification. No FV artifacts in Code4rena repo. RD-F-001 yellow Audit scope mismatch StakingManager (7 upgrades), OracleManager and StakingAccountant upgraded April 7 2026; most recent comprehensive audit (Spearbit June 2025) predates these implementations. No public audit covers current deployed bytecode for two of five core value-path contracts. RD-F-002 yellow Audit recency Most recent audit of kHYPE core contracts is Spearbit June 2025 (~348 days before assessment). Core contracts (StakingManager, StakingAccountant, OracleManager) not comprehensively re-audited post-April 2026 upgrades (~39 days unaudited at assessment). RD-F-003 yellow Resolved-without-proof findings Code4rena April 2025: 3 HIGHs (H-01/H-02/H-03 acknowledged/disputed) and 5 MEDIUMs (M-01 confirmed); no confirmed unresolved high-severity exploit path; acknowledged findings imply awareness without documented on-chain fix proof. RD-F-017 yellow Mixed-decimals math without explicit scaling StakingAccountant _getExchangeRatio() handles 8-to-18 decimal normalization for HYPE values. Code4rena H-03 (exchange ratio inflation via receive()) was acknowledged. Without static analysis of current post-April-2026 implementation this cannot be fully confirmed clean. RD-F-024 yellow Code complexity vs audit coverage 1332 nSLOC across 8 contracts. Test coverage 52% (below 80% ideal). Code4rena ran 9 days (April 7-16 2025) competitive format. Spearbit June 2025 full review. Multiple audit rounds partially compensate for sub-ideal coverage but complexity relative to audit depth is non-trivial. RD-F-010 gray Static-analyzer high-severity count No Slither/Mythril/Semgrep run possible against HyperEVM verified source from agent context. Code4rena 4naly3er report present but not parseable (binary PDF). No published static analysis severity classification for current deployed implementations. RD-F-021 n/a UUPS _authorizeUpgrade correctly permissioned Kinetiq uses TransparentUpgradeableProxy (EIP-1967) for all five core contracts — not UUPS. The _authorizeUpgrade gate factor applies only to UUPS implementations. Upgrade authority sits with ProxyAdmin (assessed in Cat 2). RD-F-004 green Audit count 5 distinct audit engagements covering kHYPE core (Pashov March 2025, Zenith March 2025, Code4rena April 2025, Spearbit June 2025, Pashov November 2025 instant-unstake) plus 3 additional for kmHYPE and sKNTQ products.
RD-F-005 green Audit firm tier Spearbit (Tier-1) audited kHYPE LST core (June 2025), kmHYPE (November 2025), and sKNTQ (January 2026). Code4rena (Tier-2 competitive platform), Pashov and Zenith (Tier-2 boutiques) also engaged.
RD-F-006 green Audit-to-deploy gap Spearbit June 2025 audit to July 2025 deploy gap is approximately 20 days — well within the 60-day green threshold. Earlier Pashov/Zenith March 2025 gap bridged by Code4rena April and Spearbit June engagements.
RD-F-007 green Bug bounty presence & max payout Active Cantina bug bounty launched September 15 2025. Max payout: Critical $5M (largest on HyperEVM per Cantina blog). High $50K. Program live with 7 core contracts in scope including all kHYPE value-path contracts.
RD-F-008 green Ignored bounty disclosure No confirmed security incidents affecting Kinetiq own deployed contracts found. Rekt.news leaderboard absent. Data cache rekt.incidents empty. No evidence of reported-and-ignored disclosure prior to any exploit.
RD-F-011 green SELFDESTRUCT reachable from non-admin path No SELFDESTRUCT/selfdestruct opcode found in any inspected contract (KHYPE.sol, StakingManager.sol, ValidatorManager.sol, OracleManager.sol). Consistent with Cancun EVM (EIP-6780 changed SELFDESTRUCT semantics) and modern solc 0.8.26.
RD-F-012 green delegatecall with user-controlled target No user-controlled delegatecall target found. StakingManager uses standard value-transfer calls to fixed addresses. TransparentUpgradeableProxy delegatecall target (implementation) is controlled only by ProxyAdmin, not by users.
RD-F-013 green Arbitrary call with user-controlled target StakingManager uses payable(L1_HYPE_CONTRACT).call with fixed or msg.sender targets; OracleManager uses try IOracleAdapter(oracle).getPerformance(validator) with admin-controlled oracle address. No fully user-controlled call target found.
RD-F-014 green Reentrancy guard on external-calling functions StakingManager has nonReentrant on 8 functions (stake, queueWithdrawal, confirmWithdrawal, batchConfirmWithdrawals, processValidatorWithdrawals, processValidatorRedelegation, queueL1Operations, processL1Operations). ValidatorManager has nonReentrant on 4 functions.
RD-F-015 green ERC-777/1155/721 hook without reentrancy guard kHYPE is ERC-20 (not ERC-777/1155/721). No ERC-777 or callback-hook token integrations found. Protocol receives native HYPE (no ERC token hooks). No callback-hook reentrancy vector detected.
RD-F-016 green Divide-before-multiply pattern StakingAccountant uses Math.mulDiv() for safe arithmetic (multiplies before dividing). No raw division-before-multiplication in price calculation paths. Code4rena 19-LOW findings produced no divide-before-multiply finding.
RD-F-018 green Signed/unsigned arithmetic confusion Solidity 0.8.x overflow protection applies throughout. No signed/unsigned arithmetic confusion flagged in any audit finding. Core accounting (StakingAccountant, StakingManager) uses standard uint256 throughout.
RD-F-019 green ecrecover zero-address return unchecked No ecrecover call found in any inspected contract. KHYPE uses OZ ERC20PermitUpgradeable v5.1.0 which handles ecrecover internally with proper zero-address checking. No raw ecrecover usage detected.
RD-F-020 green EIP-712 domain separator missing chainId KHYPE inherits ERC20PermitUpgradeable which calls __ERC20Permit_init(name). OZ v5.1.0 EIP712Upgradeable includes chainId in domain separator by default. ChainId-aware domain separator confirmed.
RD-F-022 green Public initialize() without initializer modifier All five core implementation contracts confirmed: initialize() protected by OZ initializer modifier and constructors call _disableInitializers(). KHYPE, StakingManager, StakingAccountant, ValidatorManager, OracleManager all verified.
RD-F-023 green Constructor calls _disableInitializers() _disableInitializers() confirmed in all five implementation constructors: KHYPE, StakingManager, StakingAccountant, ValidatorManager, OracleManager. OZ pattern consistently applied across the entire core contract suite.
RD-F-183 green Bug bounty scope gap on highest-TVL contracts Cantina bug bounty (September 15 2025) explicitly in-scopes all 7 core kHYPE contracts: kHYPE, StakingManager, StakingAccountant, ValidatorManager, PauserRegistry, OracleManager, OracleAdapter. No scope gap on highest-TVL contracts. $5M Critical payout.