★ Default bytes32(0) acceptable as valid root
Lido's assessment for RD-F-154 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
[★ CRITICAL] Not applicable to Lido's bridge architecture. Wormhole uses consumed-VAA hash tracking (not Merkle roots). Native L2 bridges use CrossDomainMessenger state-root proofs managed by L2 chain. Nomad-class bytes32(0) root vulnerability requires a Merkle inbox pattern not present in Lido's bridges.
Detail #
Lido's canonical bridges: (1) Wormhole NTT — VAA hash consumed-mapping, no Merkle root inbox; (2) Axelar — PoS attestation; (3) CrossDomainMessenger — state-root proofs by chain infrastructure. The Nomad bug class (bytes32(0) = valid Merkle root) requires a specific Merkle-root-acceptance inbox pattern. Lido's bridges do not have this architecture.
Sources #
- GitHub
Methodology #
Determine whether the bridge inbox accepts a default-value (bytes32(0)) Merkle root as a valid proof root (Nomad bug class).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →