Timelock on sensitive actions

Liquity V1 + V2 (LUSD / BOLD)'s assessment for RD-F-033 — scored not_applicable on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

No sensitive admin actions (mint/pause/rescue/setOracle/upgrade) are gatable by timelock because none of these actions exist in core contracts. v1 is fully automated; v2 core is immutable. No admin-callable pause or rescue function.

Sources #

Docs
Liquity v2 FAQ — GeneralLiquity v2 FAQ: 'immutable and not upgradeable'; governance cannot modify core contractsretrieved 2026-05-16
Docs
Liquity v1 FAQ — GeneralLiquity v1 FAQ: 'all operations are algorithmic and fully automated'retrieved 2026-05-16

Methodology #

For each sensitive action category (mint / pause / rescue / setOracle / upgrade), determine whether execution requires going through the declared timelock.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol liquity factor RD-F-033 score not_applicable collected_at 2026-05-16 10:35:50