First-depositor / share-inflation guard
M^0's assessment for RD-F-075 — scored not_applicable on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
First-depositor share-inflation attacks require share-based vault accounting (share price = totalAssets / totalSupply) where a donation can inflate the share price before other depositors enter. WrappedM uses principal-based indexing (not shares), so this vector does not apply. MinterGateway similarly uses a continuous global index model, not share-based accounting. No vault with share-price arithmetic exists in M^0's core architecture. PD-024: not applicable.
Sources #
- GitHubGitHub — m0-foundation/wrapped-m-token WrappedMToken.solm0-foundation/wrapped-m-token WrappedMToken.sol — principal-based indexing via IndexingMath; no totalAssets()/totalSupply() share-price calculation; no first-depositor inflation vectorretrieved 2026-05-16
- M0 Documentation — Wrapped $M OverviewWrappedM overview: solvency invariant is principal-sum based, not share-price based; no virtual-share or dead-share protection neededretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether the vault has a first-depositor guard (seed deposit on deploy, virtual-share offset, or floor-check).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →