Cross-chain bridge unverified mint pattern
M^0's assessment for RD-F-106 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Directly applicable: HubPortal (Wormhole NTT) and Portal Lite (Hyperlane) are active bridge contracts. The HubPortal uses NttManagerNoRateLimiting — no per-window outflow cap exists. A mint-without-proof scenario on a SpokePortal (if Wormhole guardian set compromised or message verification bypassed) could result in unbacked $M minting. No current cross-chain mint-without-proof event observed. Yellow because the NttManagerNoRateLimiting design amplifies potential impact of any future bridge bypass — no rate-limiter containment mechanism available. T-09 phase-2 signal tier methodology signal tier.
Sources #
- URLWormhole NTT Framework — NttManagerNoRateLimiting configurationWormhole NTT framework documentation confirming NttManagerNoRateLimiting is a valid configuration variant with no per-window rate limitretrieved 2026-05-16
- M0 Bridge Developer Documentation — Wormhole NTT NttManagerNoRateLimitingM0 bridge documentation: HubPortal and SpokePortal use Wormhole NTT framework (NttManagerNoRateLimiting — no per-window outflow cap); lock-on-Ethereum / mint-on-spoke modelretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Detect cross-chain activity consistent with an unverified mint on the destination chain (deposit on source without corresponding verified proof on dest).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →