First-depositor / share-inflation guard
Marinade Finance's assessment for RD-F-075 — scored not_applicable on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Marinade is a Solana BPF stake-pool, not an ERC-4626 vault. The first-depositor / share-inflation attack requires an EVM vault where the first depositor can manipulate the share price by donating assets directly to the contract. Marinade's BPF program controls minting via the stake-pool instruction set (CPI to Solana Stake program), and the mSOL exchange rate is updated per epoch from on-chain validator rewards — not from arbitrary token balances. Direct donation manipulation of the exchange rate is not architecturally possible. Per PD-024 and the taxonomy Compound-fork-only note, this factor is not_applicable for LST protocols on non-EVM chains.
Sources #
- GitHubMarinade Finance — Liquid Staking Program (GitHub)marinade-finance/liquid-staking-program — BPF Anchor Rust program; mSOL minting controlled by stake-pool instructions; no ERC-4626 interface; no donation-inflation vectorretrieved 2026-05-16
- Taxonomy §Category 4 PD-024 resolution03-taxonomy.md §Category 4 PD-024 resolution: RD-F-075 lending-only, not_applicable for non-lending protocolsretrieved 2026-05-16
- Marinade Documentation — What is mSOLMarinade docs — mSOL exchange rate: price = total_staked / tokens_minted, updated per Solana epoch; no external donation manipulation pathretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether the vault has a first-depositor guard (seed deposit on deploy, virtual-share offset, or floor-check).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →