defirisk.co
rubric v1.7.0

Fallback behavior on oracle failure

Meteora's assessment for RD-F-051 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

No primary oracle exists in DLMM/DAMM/DBC swap paths, making oracle-failure fallback N/A for core AMM products. For Dynamic Vault: Hermes keeper rebalances across lending platforms when one becomes unavailable, which functions as an operational fallback. However, this is keeper-dependent with no confirmed on-chain automated failover circuit. If Hermes fails, vault allocations freeze in last-known state (liveness risk, not immediate fund loss). Scored yellow for keeper-only fallback without on-chain circuit.

Sources #

  • Docs
    Dynamic Vault Algorithm DocumentationHermes rebalances every few minutes and triggers deposits/withdrawals across lending platforms; risk-based allocation caps per platformretrieved 2026-05-16
  • Docs
    Meteora Dynamic Vault DocumentationDynamic Vault safety mechanisms monitor utilization rates and automatically withdraw if risk thresholds exceeded (keeper-mediated)retrieved 2026-05-16

Methodology #

Identify the declared fallback behavior (pause, secondary source, last-known-price, revert) when the primary oracle reverts or reports a stale value.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol meteora factor RD-F-051 score yellow collected_at 2026-05-16 10:03:05