★ Rescue/emergencyWithdraw without timelock
Multipli's assessment for RD-F-041 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
[CRITICAL] MultipliBridger: removeFunds(address token, address to, uint256 amount) and removeFundsNative(address to, uint256 amount) callable by owner EOA with no timelock delay. MultipliVault: removeFunds(uint256 amount, address to) callable via requiresAuth (owner or authority) with no timelock. Both contracts allow unilateral fund drain in a single transaction by the controlling EOA.
Sources #
- EtherscanMultipliBridger — removeFunds() owner-only no timelock confirmed from verified sourceMultipliBridger 0x5d39456b verified source: removeFunds(address token, address to, uint256 amount) external onlyOwner — no timelockretrieved 2026-05-17
- MultipliVault.sol — removeFunds() requiresAuth (owner-callable) no timelockMultipliVault.sol v2: function removeFunds(uint256 amount, address to) external nonReentrant requiresAuth — no timelockretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Determine whether a `rescue(…)` or `emergencyWithdraw(…)` function exists callable by admin without a timelock delay on execution.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →
rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol multipli factor RD-F-041 score red collected_at 2026-05-17 11:48:35