defirisk.co
rubric v1.7.0

Rescue/emergencyWithdraw without timelock

Ondo Finance's assessment for RD-F-041 — scored not_applicable on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

[PD-042 rescore 2026-05-12, v1.7.0+] Forcible seize / burn / retrieve-token paths are the defining feature of a regulated tokenized RWA, REQUIRED by KYC, sanctions, and court-order compliance regimes. Treating them as a rug-risk signal misframes the protocol type. Scored not_applicable per PD-042 (Cat 2 RWA-issuer subset). ORIGINAL EVIDENCE (preserved from v1.6.0 grading): [CRITICAL] ousgInstantManager.sol exposes retrieveTokens(address token, address to) callable by DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE with no timelock. USDY InstantManager has the same pattern. Management multisig (4/7) can drain contract balances in one transaction. RWAHub.sol confirms no timelock on any admin functions.

Sources #

Methodology #

Determine whether a `rescue(…)` or `emergencyWithdraw(…)` function exists callable by admin without a timelock delay on execution.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol ondo-finance factor RD-F-041 score not_applicable collected_at 2026-05-14 12:01:55