Fallback behavior on oracle failure

Polymarket's assessment for RD-F-051 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

No automated fallback for UMA OO failure. Emergency admin override exists via flagQuestionForEmergencyResolution() + emergencyReportPayouts() (auth ward system, admin-only centralized bypass). V1 Binary Adapter has setFinderAddress() for oracle indirection. V2 primary adapter has no fallback. No confirmed Chainlink Data Streams fallback path. Centralized emergency path is a partial mitigant, not an automated fallback.

Sources #

Etherscan
Polymarket: Uma Conditional Tokens Binary Adapter — Read ContractUMA Binary Adapter v1 — setFinderAddress and emergency functions confirmedretrieved 2026-04-29
Docs
Resolution — Polymarket DocumentationResolution flow documentationretrieved 2026-04-29

Methodology #

Identify the declared fallback behavior (pause, secondary source, last-known-price, revert) when the primary oracle reverts or reports a stale value.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol polymarket factor RD-F-051 score yellow collected_at 2026-04-29 16:25:39