Security-Council threshold reduction (RT)
Polymarket's assessment for RD-F-182 — scored not_applicable on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Not applicable: Polymarket has no Security Council multisig governance structure. safe_multisigs=[] in data cache; no confirmed multisig. Admin key is single company-held key with no threshold to reduce. Drift Protocol RD-F-182 pattern (3/5 SC threshold reduction preceding $285M DPRK exploit) does not map to Polymarket's architecture. Signal cannot fire by construction.
Sources #
- Curator notePolymarket data cache + profile 2026-04-29Data cache: safe_multisigs=[]; governance.governor_address=null; profile §6: no multisig confirmedretrieved 2026-04-29
Methodology #
Detect in real-time whether the bridge/protocol Security Council multisig executes a threshold reduction (e.g. 3/5 → 2/5), timelock removal, or new-signer addition within ≤14 days of either of those events.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →