Timelock on sensitive actions

QuickSwap's assessment for RD-F-033 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

No timelock on any sensitive admin action. V3 AlgebraFactory functions setFarmingAddress(), setVaultAddress(), setBaseFeeConfiguration(), setOwner() — all onlyOwner with zero delay. V2 Factory setFeeTo(), setFeeToSetter() — callable by feeToSetter EOA with zero delay. Treasury multisig executes with 2 sigs, no delay.

Sources #

GitHub
AlgebraFactory source — admin functions with no timelockAlgebraFactory.sol source shows onlyOwner modifier on all admin functions, no timelock patternretrieved 2026-05-16
Etherscan
QuickSwap V2 Factory — feeToSetterV2 Factory Polygonscan confirmed feeToSetter=deployer EOA, no timelock on setFeeTo/setFeeToSetterretrieved 2026-05-16

Methodology #

For each sensitive action category (mint / pause / rescue / setOracle / upgrade), determine whether execution requires going through the declared timelock.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol quickswap factor RD-F-033 score red collected_at 2026-05-16 08:48:31