First-depositor / share-inflation guard
QuickSwap's assessment for RD-F-075 — scored not_applicable on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
First-depositor / share-inflation guard is scoped to ERC-4626 vault patterns. dQUICK Dragon's Lair is not ERC-4626 (same basis as F074). The xSUSHI-style ratio mechanism does have a theoretical first-depositor inflation issue if the pool is empty, but: (1) F075 specifically targets ERC-4626 vault designs; (2) the Dragon's Lair has been continuously active since 2021 and holds material QUICK (pool not empty); (3) the xSUSHI pattern vulnerability is distinct from the ERC-4626 first-depositor attack. This factor is not_applicable under PD-024 ERC-4626 vault sub-bucket scoping. DEX core contracts (V2/V3) have no vault/share accounting at all.
Sources #
- InternalQuickSwap protocol profile — Dragon's Lair and admin multisig00-profile.md §3: Dragon's Lair described as 'staking vault contract' with no ERC-4626 reference; admin multisig holds 100M QUICK confirming pool operationalretrieved 2026-05-16
- QuickSwap documentation — Dragon's Lair overviewQuickSwap docs Dragon's Lair — staking active since 2021; no lock-up; variable dQUICK rate confirms ongoing pool activityretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether the vault has a first-depositor guard (seed deposit on deploy, virtual-share offset, or floor-check).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →