Timelock on sensitive actions
Save (formerly Solend)'s assessment for RD-F-033 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No on-chain timelock covers any sensitive action. Program upgrades (EOA, instant), reserve parameter changes (lending market owner, instant), Recovery Mode activation (council-of-contributors, instant — docs state this is invoked during volatility without formal on-chain timelock), treasury/LM fund movements (Squads multisig approval, time_lock=null). Zero timelocked sensitive actions.
Sources #
- URLSave Access Controlsdocs.save.finance/architecture/access-controls — admin role description; no timelock notedretrieved 2026-05-17
- Save Protocol Parameters — Recovery Mode (no timelock)docs.save.finance/protocol/parameters — Recovery Mode described; no timelock on parameter changesretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
For each sensitive action category (mint / pause / rescue / setOracle / upgrade), determine whether execution requires going through the declared timelock.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →