★ Flash-loanable voting weight
Save (formerly Solend)'s assessment for RD-F-036 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
SPL governance (Realms) voting weight = tokens deposited into realm; not time-locked, not snapshotted at proposal creation. The SLND1 incident (June 2022) confirmed: a single address transferred 1M SLND in, voted, moved tokens back out — demonstrating weight is determined by deposited balance. No vote-escrow lock (no veSLND). Full flash-loan atomicity constrained by Solana transaction architecture (deposit and vote are separate txs). Flash-loan attack requires separate deposit transaction but within-block coordination is possible in theory. Practical exploitability limited by current SLND liquidity for flash loans; not zero. Yellow: structural risk real but not fully atomically exploitable.
Sources #
- URLSPL Governance README — deposit-based voting weightSPL governance README — 'voters can deposit Governing tokens to the realm and use the deposited amount as their voting weight'retrieved 2026-05-17
- Protos — Solend governance concentration analysis (SLND1)Protos SLND1 analysis — single wallet transferred 1M tokens in, voted, moved them back; 88% of votes from one addressretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Determine whether governance voting power is a function of current token balance of a transferable token with no lock or checkpoint, making it flash-loan susceptible.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →