Stablecoin depeg >2% on shared-LP venue

Save (formerly Solend)'s assessment for RD-F-104 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

Stablecoin depeg >2% on venues with shared LP. T-09 v1 shortlist — phase-2. Applicable: Save's markets include USDC, USDT, SOL-stablecoins as collateral and borrowing assets across 13 isolated pools plus main pool. Historical context: the Nov 2022 USDH oracle attack was effectively a stablecoin (USDH) depeg-via-manipulation event that drained $1.26M from Solend's USDH isolated pools — exactly the F104 scenario class. No current stablecoin depeg >2% detected on Solana DEX venues as of 2026-05-17. Stablecoin dependency map for Solend's 13+ pools not built in pipeline.

Sources #

Internal
Save protocol profile — 13 isolated pools.research/protocols/save/00-profile.md §3 — 13 confirmed isolated lending pools on Solana mainnetretrieved 2026-05-17
URL
Immunebytes — Solend Isolated Pools Exploitation Nov 2022Nov 2022 USDH manipulation: USDH pumped from $0.99 to $8.80 (first attempt) — exact F104 scenario classretrieved 2026-05-17

Methodology #

Detect whether a stablecoin in this protocol's dependency graph depegs >2% on a venue with shared liquidity.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol save factor RD-F-104 score gray collected_at 2026-05-17 15:20:15