Mixer withdrawal → protocol interaction
Stake DAO's assessment for RD-F-090 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
T-09 phase-2 signal (tier-C, advisory-only). No wallet matching the mixer-withdrawal + protocol-interaction + ≥2-attribution-source profile detected touching Stake DAO core contracts. Deployer wallet (0x000755Fbe4A24d7478bfcFC1E561AfCE82d1ff62) funded by protocol governance multisig system, not a mixer. Zunami Aug 2023 attacker used Tornado Cash AFTER the exploit as laundering venue — this is adversarial-venue-use (U4 passive-venue rule, does not trigger RD-F-090 which requires prospective mixer-funded wallet interacting with the protocol). No Tornado Cash interactions on governance multisig 0xf930ebbd or deployer wallet detected. Signal would not fire today.
Sources #
- URLExplained: The Zunami Protocol Hack (August 2023) | HalbornZunami exploit — attacker laundered ~1183 ETH via Tornado Cash post-exploit; Stake DAO pool was used as manipulation venue (not victim)retrieved 2026-05-16
- Stake DAO: Deployer | EtherscanStake DAO deployer wallet transaction history — no Tornado Cash interactionsretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Detect whether a wallet that recently withdrew from Tornado Cash, Railgun, or similar mixer has interacted with this protocol.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →