Bridge TVL per validator ratio
Stargate Finance's assessment for RD-F-157 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Bridge TVL per validator ratio | ~$92M TVL (DefiLlama, 2026-05-07) divided by 2 required DVNs = ~$46M per DVN. This remains a meaningful concentration per verifier, though down materially from the ~$172.5M per DVN figure at v2 launch peak (~$345M TVL). Historical anchor: peak v2 TVL of ~$345M implied $172.5M/DVN, which exceeded the Kelp exploit setup ($292M/1 DVN under 1/1 config); current ratio is roughly 6x safer per-DVN than Kelp's 1/1, but still well above multi-DVN-stack bridges. With only 2 independent operators required, each represents the full ~$92M attack surface if either can be coerced or compromised in coordination with the other. Score retained gray (no v1.6 score-input flip): qualitative concern persists but TVL contraction reduces acute magnitude. | Profile: TVL ~$92M (down from ~$345M peak); L2BEAT: 2 required DVNs.
Sources #
- URLhttps://api.llama.fi/protocol/stargate-financeretrieved 2026-05-06
- Extracted from 03-oracle-deps.md — RD-F-157; no URL citedretrieved 2026-04-28
Methodology #
Compute bridge TVL divided by validator count as a concentration-of-compromise measure.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →