Oracle staleness check present
Superstate's assessment for RD-F-059 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Staleness checks present: (1) RedemptionIdle: maximumOracleDelay (storage variable, admin-settable via setMaximumOracleDelay()) — validated in getChainlinkPrice(); 0xMacro superstate-4 L-2 fixed missing validation at subscribe time. (2) SuperstateOracle: CHECKPOINT_EXPIRATION_PERIOD = 430,080s (5 days) — appropriate for T-bill fund (no weekend NAV), but wider than 3600s DeFi-volatile-asset threshold. (3) Pyth Solana: native Pyth confidence/age check. Yellow: staleness checks present but 5-day expiration window is wide by DeFi norms for this TVL; maximumOracleDelay exact value not confirmed.
Sources #
- EtherscanRedemptionIdle Implementation — EtherscanRedemptionIdle impl 0x8EFBa8Af... — maximumOracleDelay state variable + setMaximumOracleDelay() function; getChainlinkPrice() validates updatedAt freshnessretrieved 2026-05-16
- 0xMacro superstate-4 Audit Report0xMacro superstate-4 L-2: Inadequate subscription validation — maximumOracleDelay > 0 check missing at subscribe enablement; fixed in final coderetrieved 2026-05-16
- SuperstateOracle readContract — EtherscanSuperstateOracle readContract 0xe4fa682f... — CHECKPOINT_EXPIRATION_PERIOD = 0x0206978081 = 430080 seconds (5 days)retrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether the protocol rejects oracle reads older than a declared maximum age (i.e., checks `updatedAt > block.timestamp - maxStaleness`).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →