Large governance proposal queued
Uniswap (v2 + v3)'s assessment for RD-F-101 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
V2+V3 combined: V2 has no governance. V3: GovernorBravoDelegator (0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3) is live and active. UNIfication/tokenomics proposals executed March 2026 — healthy governance activity. No malicious-pattern indicators: no new-wallet proposer, no admin-role-change calldata (V3 core immutable so such calls impossible anyway), no flash-loanable quorum (checkpoint voting design), no delegatecall to non-allowlisted targets. 2-day Timelock (172,800s delay) intact. Signal would NOT fire today.
Detail #
Malicious-pattern checks per T-09 §4.3: (1) Proposer wallet age <30 days creating a proposal with admin-role-change calldata — not detected; (2) Calldata containing delegatecall to non-allowlisted target — not applicable (V3 core immutable, V3 Governor controls only fee switch and treasury grants); (3) Flash-loan-feasible quorum — structurally impossible per checkpoint voting; (4) Co-signed by long-tenured delegate — suppression criteria. Quorum: 40,000,000 UNI (4% of 1B supply) per profile §6. Proposal threshold: 2,500,000 UNI. Voting period: ~7 days (40,320 blocks). Current governance is operating on normal cadence. V2 is fully immutable with no governance surface.
Sources #
- URL
- GovernorBravoDelegator Etherscan — Active GovernanceGovernorBravoDelegator 0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3 — recent transactions showing normal governance activity (Cast Vote, Queue, Execute March 2026)retrieved 2026-05-12
Methodology #
Detect whether a governance proposal with potentially protocol-impactful payload has been queued for execution (including Security-Council threshold-reduction variant).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →