Fallback behavior on oracle failure
USDD (Decentralized USD)'s assessment for RD-F-051 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No explicit fallback oracle documented. OSM holds last-known price if no valid update arrives (implicit stale freeze). No secondary fallback oracle or circuit-breaker-to-pause documented. Critically: ChainSecurity Jan-2025 audit confirmed 'risk of Governance Delay is Currently Disabled was accepted' — the OSM governance delay buffer that allows human intervention before a compromised oracle price propagates is currently disabled, significantly weakening fallback protection.
Sources #
- AuditPUBLIC Code Assessment of USDD V2 Smart Contracts, January 24 2025ChainSecurity USDD V2 audit Jan 2025: 'risk of Governance Delay is Currently Disabled was accepted'; 'active monitoring is required to ensure the oracle and governance work correctly'retrieved 2026-05-17
- USDD OSM Contract DocsOSM: 'ensures that new price values propagated from the Oracles are not taken up by the system until a specified delay has passed' — but delay currently disabled per auditretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Identify the declared fallback behavior (pause, secondary source, last-known-price, revert) when the primary oracle reverts or reports a stale value.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →